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Abstract: This special issue of Algorithms is devoted to the study of matching problems 
involving ordinal preferences from the standpoint of algorithms and complexity. 
Keywords: stable marriage problem; hospitals/residents problem; stable roommates problem; 
optimal matching; stable matching; stable flow; algorithms and complexity 
 
1. Introduction 
Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications, such as the assignment of 
school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to 
schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that individuals have 
ordinal preferences over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that 
is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences. Due to the large numbers of agents typically 
involved in such applications, efficient algorithms are of paramount importance. 
These types of problems can generally be categorized according to whether the problem is bipartite or 
non-bipartite. In the former case there are two disjoint sets of agents who seek to become matched to one 
another. Typical examples include the Stable Marriage, Hospitals/Residents and House Allocation 
problems, which have applications in school choice, for example. Non-bipartite matching problems 
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involve a single set of agents seeking to become matched within themselves, and a typical problem in 
this category is the Stable Roommates problem, which has applications in kidney exchange, P2P 
networking and tournament design. 
2. Special Issue 
This special issue focuses on matching problems involving preferences from an algorithms and 
complexity point of view. The call for papers was issued following the workshop MATCH-UP 2012: the 
Second International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences, which took place in Budapest on 
19–20 July 2012. Hence some of the papers appearing in this issue are fully revised and extended 
versions of papers that appeared in the informal workshop proceedings. However, submission to the 
special issue was not restricted to papers that appeared at this workshop.  
In response to the call for papers, we received a total of 15 submissions. All submissions were 
reviewed by experts. We selected 11 submissions for the special issue, all of which are of high quality, 
reflecting the growing interest in the area of matching under preferences in the community. The final 
versions of these articles were published as [1–11]. 
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